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STRATEGI KEWACANAAN DAN TOPOS BERIDEOLOGI DALAM 
WACANA JIHAD AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI DAN ABU BAKR AL-
BAGHDADI: ANALISIS WACANA KRITIS 
 
ABSTRAK 
        Kajian ini tentang penggunaan strategi kewacanaan dan topos berideologi dalam 
ucapan politik pemimpin al-Qa'ida, Ayman al-Zawahiri dan pemimpin ISIS, Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi, yang mempunyai perspektif sejarah-politik yang berbeza. Kajian ini 
terhasil oleh sebab tertarik dengan cara bahasa figuratif dan retoris yang digunakan 
dalam jihad politik. Sejak kebangkitan dua gerakan radikal sebagai hasil pergolakan 
perang di Iraq (2003-2011), revolusi Arab (2010-sekarang) dan perang saudara di 
Syria (2011-sekarang), peningkatan kuasa pemimpin bukan kerajaan mereka 
menjadikan usaha mereka untuk menguruskan ucapan politik, mengenal pasti topik 
wacana jihad, strategi kewacanaan, topos, kekeliruan dan alat pengesahtarafan mikro 
mereka penting. Kajian ini mengkaji retorik jihad al-Qa'ida dan ISIS dari perspektif 
wacana analitis multidisiplin untuk mendalami pemahaman kita tentang kuasa politik 
dan retorik kedua-dua gerakan. Untuk mencapai matlamat ini, lima buah teks ucapan 
bagi setiap pemimpin bukan kerajaan dianalisis berpandukan alat metodologi yang 
diutarakan oleh Reisigl dan Wodak DHA (2001; 2009) dan dataran ideologi van Dijk 
(1998). Analisis terperinci topik wacana dalam retorik jihad al-Zawahiri dan al-
Baghdadi menegaskan bahawa pengesahtarafan ‘Self’ pada dasarnya disesuaikan 
dengan membina dan mengesahkan ‘Other’ sebagai kejahatan dan sebagai suatu 
ancaman pada masa akan datang. Walaupun pihak berkuasa agama biasanya dilayan 
dengan penuh hormat dan dihargai sebagai tanda penghormatan, pihak ini digunakan 
sebagai sumber rujukan, predikasi dan bahan hujahan dalam perbuatan ganas. Kajian 
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ini menyimpulkan bahawa kejayaan al-Zawahiri dan al-Baghdadi dalam memperoleh 
sokongan meluas ekstremisme dalam kalangan umat Islam melalui taktik retorik 
mereka menunjukkan penyisihan melampau yang dirasai oleh kebanyakan golongan 
belia Arab daripada kerajaan tempatan sendiri secara khususnya dan daripada penaja 


















IDEOLOGICAL TOPOI AND DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES IN AYMAN 
AL-ZAWAHIRI’S AND ABU BAKR AL-BAGHADADI’S JIHADI 
SPEECHES: A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
 
ABSTRACT 
     This study on the use of discursive strategies and ideological topoi as reflected in 
the political speeches of al-Qa’ida’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri and ISIS leader, Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi, drawing on different historical-political perspectives, is the result 
of a particular interest in the ways rhetorical and figurative language is employed in 
jihadi politics. Since the rise of the two radical movements as an outcome of the 
convulsions of the war in Iraq (2003-2011), the Arab revolutions (2010-present) and 
the civil war in Syria (2011-present), the increasing power of the non-state leaders 
makes it crucial to study their political speeches, to identify their jihadi discourse 
topics, their discursive strategies, topoi, fallacies and their micro-legitimatory tools. 
The study approaches al-Qa’ida and ISIS jihadi rhetoric from a multidisciplinary 
discourse-analytical perspective to deepen our understanding of the two movements’ 
political power and rhetoric. To achieve this aim, five speeches for each of the two 
non-state leaders are analyzed with methodological tools provided by Reisigl’s and 
Wodak’s (2001; 2009) discourse-historical approach and van Dijk’s (1998) ideological 
square. The extensive analyses of the discourse topics in the jihadi rhetoric of al-
Zawahiri and al-Baghdadi designate that the legitimisation of ‘Self’ is basically 
tailored via constructing and de- legitimising the ‘Other’ as evil and as a forthcoming 
threat. Even though religious authority is treated with respect and appreciated as a sign 
of veneration, it is employed as a source of referential, predication and argumentation 
for violent acts. The study concludes that the progress of both non-state leaders in 
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capturing widespread support for extremism among Muslims via their rhetorical 
tactics is inextricably linked to the enormous degrees of alienation that distance many 
Arab youths from their own local governments in particular and from their Western 


















1.0 Overview of the Study 
Few topoi of Islam have occupied Western public eye, scholarly studies and media 
on a daily basis as much as jihad (El-Fadl, 2005). Since September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks, Western writers have set out to criticize the image of jihad in Islam which, 
they thought, was usurped by the two global and local Salafi Jihadi Organizations, al-
Qa’ida and the Islamic State (IS) (See Ibrahim, 2013). They usually rendered it as 
“holy war” in English. Fadel, for instance, maintains that it is connoted with “icons of 
swarthy, bearded men wearing flowing cloaks and turbans, perhaps riding horses, 
screaming unintelligible words [and] killing all people in their path” (2012, p.8). 
Despite the scholarly contributions to this Islamic topos, what seems perplexing is 
how differently religious scholars consider jihad (Hassan, 2014). There seems to be 
many subsequent statements and behavioural aspects that have made this topos 
mystifying. Jihad, as portrayed by Western writers and as manipulated by Islamic, is 
often equated with the images of religious intolerance (Spencer, 2008, 2013, 2015). 
Besides, the concept has blurred the worldly stance of Islam as one of the largest 
religions. For it is stereotyped differently in Muslim and non-Muslim cultures. The 
former regard it a sanctioned warfare, but the latter a false excuse for killing them.    
Traditional Islamic scholars agree to differ on the meaning of jihad, they accept 
that the topos of jihad carries a general meaning that is derived from the Arabic term 
jahada, which means “to strive”, but they decide not to assign the same specific 
meanings to it (Cook, 2005; Hassan, 2014). At the etymological level, the term means 
“to strive” and “to surrender” to God’s orders, be it in carrying out ritual practices such 
as praying and fasting or in protecting one’s self from carnal desires (Lane, 1968). The 
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specific meaning of jihad is a conflict against corrupt enemies (Huzen, 2008). Yet, 
religious scholars did not fully debate the justifications for armed jihad in terms of its 
objective interpretations of the Qur’an, prophetic hadiths and the Islamic scholarship, 
especially those recorded by the two books, Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim. 
Jihad, as a purely Islamic topos, has evolved in response to a number of historical 
and political contexts that construct a range of divine interactions between God and 
His Prophet, Muhammad in the 7th century (Peters, 1996; Shienbaum and Hasan, 
2006; Khadduri, 2007). However, in the contemporary world, mostly after the violent 
attacks of the so-called jihadi groups of al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State (IS), it came 
to be seen by Western writers as a method for Islamization; an instrument for 
converting non-Muslims; a religious rule for booty and a just war connected with 
notions of Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam and (Bostom, 2005; Gerges, 2005; 
Armstrong, 2006; Huzen, 2008; Esposito and Kalin, 2011, Ibrahim, 2007). These 
misconceptions are guided by political explications at face value for the Qur’an and 
the prophet’s sayings. 
For example, Spencer (2006, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2015) wrote more than ten 
books for different American official institutions such as the FBI and the U.S. 
intelligence community to inform them that Islam teaches that Muslims must break 
out a war to impose shariah law on non-Muslims. He argues that al-Qa’ida and the 
Islamic State partake today the same religious obligations and targets the old Muslims 
had. What is even worse, he argues that American Muslim groups are being enrolled 
in a vast conspiracy to convert non-Muslims into Islam. Most of his arguments are 
directed by al-Qa’ida’s and IS’s actions and claims for applying shariah law. 
From an analytical perspective, for al-Qa’ida and IS terrorist groups, jihad must be 
performed through ideological topoi and discursive strategies that are deeply rooted in 
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the Qur’an, the prophet’s tradition, jurisdictional analogy and Muslim consensus (See 
Ibrahim, 2007, al-Zawahiri, 2010). To achieve that, their non-state leaders have 
continuously manipulated the historical, linguistic and pragmatic experiences familiar 
to most Muslims. For example, they rely on the spiritual commitment of all Muslims 
to refer to armed jihad as a neglected duty for a pure faith (See Jansen and Faraj, 1986; 
Akbari, 2013). Western and some Muslim scholars, vulnerable to such topoi, tend to 
see jihad uncritically as an ideology that is representative of Islam. They relate the 
pointless pursuit of violence of al-Qa’ida and IS groups to discursive tactics of Islamic 
jurisprudence. This often leads to great fallacies, especially in Western media in which 
traditional Islamic jihad as such is often equated with ‘global jihadism’.  
However, one might argue that the topos of jihad in Islamic jurisprudence is a 
multifaceted process. Historically, it is related to the contextual knowledge of Muslims 
since the era of the Prophet Muhammad and the first four caliphs. While the Qur’an, 
the Prophet’s hadiths and the scholar’s verdicts might provide a framework for 
conflict, the nature of Islamic response today is determined by the type of context and 
the threats challenging Muslims in daily life. It is not resolved by the unequivocal 
accounts of these religious resources that the jihadi groups have tried to transfer to 
Muslims everywhere. 
1.0.1 Discourse Analysis and Speeches of Jihad 
Discourse Analysis (DA) is a great part of linguistics that is associated, generally 
speaking, with highlighting the traces of ideological meanings in spoken and written 
texts (Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard, 1996; Fairclough, 2002; Weiss and Wodak, 
2003; Blommaert, 2005; van Dijk, 2006). One specific meditation for DA is to stress 
how a political discourse can perplex the social implications it transfers. It focuses on 
the study of how to unmask indirectness, maneuvering and obliqueness in political 
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texts (Grice, 1991; Yule, 1996; Obeng, 1997; Wodak, 2007; van Eemeren, 2010). 
What impacts are there, for instance, when government officials talk about Muslim 
militants?  
Theoretically speaking, discourse analysts, through language, study political belief 
systems and discursive strategies of social structures that are delivered in a political 
discourse since they think there are solid and inescapable associations between these 
elements (Kress, 1990; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, 2009; Hart 2010). These political 
ideologies and discursive strategies of social structures may have key social effects on 
human life via the ways in which they represent people by selecting positive words for 
Us and negative words for Them (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; van Dijk, 1998). For 
example, one of the IS leaders, al-Adnani, quoted in Weiss and Hassan (2015), uses 
jihadi language to shift blame from responsibility of crimes, saying,  
If you can kill a disbelieving American or European — especially 
the spiteful and filthy French — or an Australian, or a Canadian, 
or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war… then 
rely upon Allah and kill him (p. xvii). 
 
In such a statement of absolute prejudice, al-Adnani uses shift blame as a strategy to 
dehumanize all nations by considering them enemies of the so-called Islamic State and 
God. He considers all Americans, all French, all Australians, all Canadians and all 
people coming from European countries to be disbelievers who must be killed. 
Whether they have participated or not in the war or whether they are young or old, 
they have to be murdered in any available means (Weiss and Hassan, 2015).  
In such manipulative discourses, al-Qa’ida and IS leaders play upon language with 
their audiences’ beliefs about the future threats in order to achieve certain political 
goals (Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning and Breen-Smyth, 2011). The use of political speeches 
by their leaders can tell researchers a great deal about ideological manipulation, the 
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politics of representation, indirectness in political language, discursive strategies and 
topoi that reflect the language use (Obeng, 1997; van Eemeren, 2010, Reisigl and 
Wodak, 2009). Due to its political and ideological significance, non-state political 
speeches have become vital sources of information and social control of peoples’ 
mental models. Practitioners of DA such as Jackson (2005) and Wodak (2009) have 
acknowledged that the political speeches are the main actors in shaping the ideology 
of violent discourse. 
1.1 Statement of the Problem  
Even though the scholarly pursuit over the US-led war on Iraq in 2003 has 
produced insightful discourse analysis studies, the resurgence of al-Qa’ida and IS in 
Iraq as a probable by-product of U.S. policy failure in that war has indeed intensified 
the need for more in-depth analysis of the jihadi speeches by non-state leaders such as 
al-Zawahiri and al-Baghdadi. The present study looks at the way macro-ideological 
premises, discursive strategies, topoi and micro-legitimatory procedures that have 
been adopted by each one of the non-state leaders to “construct his own legitimacy of 
jihadi ideology” on the basis of “the de-legitimacy of the other” (Tuner, 2014; Byman, 
2015). There is a need for developing alternative contexts and analyses for speeches 
raising tensions between Islam and the West, which display how religious texts have 
been misused.  
Noticeably, the non-state leaders of al-Qa’ida and IS have deployed their jihadi 
language as weapons to exert ideological control and make target people believe in 
their manipulative discourse (Chilton, 2004, Pennebaker and Chung, 2007; Warrick, 
2015). Through a carefully constructed discourse, those leaders have purported a new 
social reality where Western troops are seen as an evil force primarily causing assaults 
on Muslim civilians, while the Mujahideen risk their lives in local and foreign lands 
6 
 
to help innocent citizens combat legions of evil, with Western civilisation itself 
standing against Islam (Jackson, 2005; Moghadam, 2008, Jackson et al., 2011).  
As a non-state leader of the al-Qa’ida Salafi organization, al-Zawahiri, often 
delivers his religious messages through his skillful use of language. He adjusts the 
range of his ideological topoi and discursive strategies to implement the order of the 
speech necessary to entice his audience. These religious topoi have gained little 
attention from Western scholars. Though Chilton (2004) confirms the need for 
studying such religious topoi and discursive strategies in depth, critical discourse 
analysts like Fairclough (2006), van Dijk (2008) and Wodak (2009) seem to pay little 
attention to religious language believing that it has little power over Western society. 
They also seem to lack relevant textual and contextual knowledge necessary to analyze 
jihadi rhetoric. 
On the other hand, Arab discourse analysts have recently endeavored to shed light 
on religious topoi and discursive strategies in the hope of changing their regimes by 
democratic reforms since 2011, even though they have shown little attention to 
applying critical theories to non-state leaders’ speeches (Asharf, 2011; El-Sharif, 
2011). This can be attributed to the dialectical relationship between the response of 
Arab society and the system of non-state authority: if it is Islamic extremist, it is hard 
for researchers to reveal to their people the negative images of the non-state Muslim 
leaders. If it is Islamic and constitutional, however, the task might be harder. Ibrahim 
(2007) and Spencer (2016) maintain that the non-state leaders’ speeches 
are jurisprudentially complicated and that is why the analysts dislike studying them. 
To fill the gap, I set out to review the non-state leaders’ messages via ideological topoi, 
discursive strategies (at macro-, meso and micro-levels) and other micro-legitimatory 
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tools such as presuppositions, implicatures, modality and tropes, as they have been 
employed in their political speeches.  
A more radical religious language has emerged at the hands of a recent non-state 
leader of another Salafi jihadi organization, al-Baghdadi, who has announced his so-
called Islamic State (IS) in the wake of the U.S. overthrow of Saddam’s regime 
(Atwan, 2008, McCants, 2015). In all his jihadi speeches, he has used language and 
rhetoric for Islamic community to create religious bias against Muslims and non-
Muslims (Yetiv, 2013). Even though he did not show strong beliefs in the doctrines of 
Islam, based on spiritual conviction, he tended to use scared language and religious 
practices to achieve his political goals (Schmid, 2015). Seeking a rationale for his 
jihadi discourse, he often needed to touch on a sensitive spot related to the feelings of 
his followers to show ostensibly his religious concerns and divine ambitions.  
I am motivated by the rarity of historical and political discourse studies concerning 
the subsequent speeches of non-state leaders in terms of the macro-ideological topoi, 
discursive strategies and micro-legitimatory mechanisms used to construct the 
legitimacy of jihadi ideology. The relevant literature shows that many Western 
linguists such as Charteris-Black (2005; 2014), Hart (2010), among others, have 
studied rhetorical tropes in political language (e.g. allusions and metaphor). On the 
other hand, hardly could I find any critical discourse analysis combining these two 
non-state leaders with their political and ideological discourses of the Self and the 
Other through quotes of religious texts, Prophetic traditions and other Islamic 
resources. 
I will also make use of the notions of topoi and discursive strategies, as reflected 
in van Dijk’s (1998) and Reisigl and Wodak’s (2001, 2009) discoursal and ideological 
models, to analyse the non-state leaders’ speeches. In other words, topoi and discursive 
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strategies have been made the fresh fruit of investigation for many years especially 
after being re-introduced with new orientations by CDA scholars like Thompson 
(1990), Yule (1996), Chilton and Schaffner (2002), but their actually prominence and 
significant contribution are due to van Dijk’s (1998) ideological square and Reisigl 
and Wodak’s (2001, 2009) historical-discourse approach. The present study 
consolidates that the non-state producers of fatwas have only made use of different 
discoursal strategies aiming at achieving their own ideological and manipulative aims. 
On the macro level, these strategies recount to the topoi of their speeches. On the meso 
level, their strategies are concerned with discoursal structures such as how arguments 
and warrants are presented and how various sections of their texts are constructed. At 
the micro level, the micro-legitimatory tools involve such procedures as 
presuppositions, repetition and parallelism, modality and tropes. 
1.2 Research Objectives  
The study aims at fulfilling the following objectives: 
1. To identify the macro discourse topics that al-Qa’ida’s leader, al- Zawahiri and ISIS 
leader, al-Baghdadi, (with different historical-political perspectives) use to construct 
and (de)legitimise the Self and the Other in their political speeches? 
2. To identify the discursive strategies and rhetorical topoi that IS’s leader, al-
Baghdadi, (with different historical-political perspectives), use to construct and 
(de)legitimise the Self and the Other in his speeches on global and local jihad. 
3. To unravel the jihadi ideology in their selected political speeches. 
1.3 Research Questions 
The Study attempts to answer the following questions: 
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1. What are the macro discourse topics that al-Qa’ida’s leader, al- Zawahiri and ISIS 
leader, al-Baghdadi, (with different historical-political perspectives) use to construct 
and (de)legitimise the Self and the Other in their political speeches? 
2. How do al-Qa’ida’s leader, al-Zawahiri and ISIS leader, al-Baghdadi, (with 
different historical-political perspectives) discursively construct and (de)legitimise 
the Self and the Other in their political speeches? 
3. How is jihadi ideology portrayed in their selected political speeches? 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
It is expected that the discursive analysis can assist Western experts and Muslim 
readers to critically read and assess the non-state leaders’ statements concerning this 
vital aspect of Islam objectively. It is expected that the present study is of value to 
linguists, critical discourse analysts, politicians, and many scholars who actually wish 
to understand the wording and representation of jihad, the representation of Westerns 
as the “Other” and Muslims and Islam as the “Self”. It is also of interest to academic 
researchers concerned with issues like Islam-West relations and clashes of 
civilisations. 
The body of literature reinforces the hypothesis that political speeches influence 
public minds and represent political issues from the perspectives their speakers need 
(Schaffner, 1997; Jackson, 2005). The literature confirms that the effects of the 
political speeches stem from the supremacy of the manipulative ideologies and 
discursive strategies that these speeches create. Because of this supremacy, the 
political speeches of non-state readers have become the focus of many critical analysts 
such as Jackson (2005), Fairclough (2006) and Jackson et al. (2011).  
The foregoing statement could be attributed to two important reasons. The first is, 
according to van Dijk (2002; 2006), due to the function of the political speeches which 
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is principally ideological. Language (jihad) is the root of all manipulative ideologies, 
and so it plays a crucial analytical role in identifying politics. Chilton (2004) sees 
language of Ibn Laden’s jihad as the most effective medium al-Qa’ida’s leaders use 
not only to interact with its followers, but also to characterize the world in the way 
they need. The second is that the political speeches, manipulation (ideology) and 
language (jihad) are connected systems for discourse analysis to work on. 
1.5 Scope and Limitation of the Study 
Five speeches of al-Zawahiri (2002-2012) and five speeches of al-Baghdadi that 
are delivered over the periods (2013-2016) will be examined. During these periods, 
global and local jihadism, represented by beheading and burning Muslims and non-
Muslims alive has been chiefly performed by al-Qa’ida’s and the Islamic State’s 
suicide bombers in Iraq, Syria, Libya and elsewhere (Byman 2015).  
Haykel (cited in Rasheed, 2015), when comparing the two organizations, stressed 
that “violence is part of their ideology”, “for al-Qaida, violence is a means to an end; 
for IS, it is an end in itself” (p.40). AI-Qa’ida’s former leader, Ibn Laden, has recruited 
al-Zarqawi in 2004 to establish (IS) as a local branch for al-Qa’ida in Iraq, but later 
this local branch becomes al-Qa’ida’s greatest opponent. This rift is attributed to the 
differences in ideology of saving the Muslim community from all those who reject 
their political beliefs of shariah. AI-Zarqawi, and al-Baghdadi later, have believed in 
violent removal of all Muslims and non-Muslims who do not conform to their literal 
Salafi ideals of monotheism and jihad in Iraq and Syria, while al-Zawahiri believed 
that it was not Muslims but the Pan-American institutions of “apostates” and “infidels” 
which need to be removed (Rasheed, 2015, pp. 40-42).  
I really think comparing the discursive strategies and topoi in the political speeches 
of both leaders is valid because it considers the basic ideas, values and goals of the two 
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organizations. For al-Zawahiri’s speeches, they are collected from Mansfield (2006). 
According to the translator, the book (in its Arabic version) was completed sometime 
around 9/11 and was originally published in a serial form by the Arabic-language 
Saudi newspaper, al-Sharq al-Awsat, in October 2001. A second source for the 
translation of al-Zawahiri’s key statements is The Al-Qaeda Reader by Ibrahim (2007). 
The third source will be IntelCenter (2008, 2010) as well as famous websites such as 
GTRP, SITE Intelligence Group and MEMRI.  
Because of the shortage in the translated sources for IS non-state leader’s speeches, 
the dataset will be collected through IS’s websites such as al-Hayat Media Center and 
al-Furqan Media Foundation (IS Media Wings) which have recurrently translated his 
letters and audiotapes as well as from several Western and Eastern well-known 
websites such as START, MEMRI and SITE. The analysis will concentrate on the 
translated primary sources rather than the spoken ones. Also, the analysis in this study 
will cover the verbal facets of the speeches (e.g. written texts, radio and other media) 
and neglect the non-verbal aspects (e.g., body language, gestures, dress and act) in this 
discourse. Among other interactive devices, visuals will be excluded since the focus is 
on the written texts which transfer jihadi leaders’ central messages to the public.  
In short, the study will look at how ideological topoi, discursive strategies 
(macro/meso and micro level) and other micro-legitimatory mechanisms which are 
employed to legitimise the Self and delegitimise the Other. Finally, this study stresses 
the meso-macro strategies manipulated to specify the global meanings of discourse. 
At the micro level, legitimatory tools such as presuppositions, parallelism, modality 
and tropes will be examined to show how both non-leaders operate their supporters’ 
minds to commit jihadi operations. These levels of analysis will help in revealing the 
jihadi ideology in this discourse genre. 
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1.6 Definitions of Key Terms 
This section includes brief definitions for the key terms employed in this study 
even though they will be explained further in chapter 2 and chapter 3. 
1.6.1 Jihad  
Jihad is a call to the truth by heart, tongue or hand, under the direct supervision of 
a prophet or an Imam, or else, it would be a sort of abuse to religion. However, 
semantic priorities of jihad in Islam are different from those notions of religious and 
historical realities. Bicer (2010, p.48) stated that “the aggressive conquest came first, 
and then additional meanings became attached” to jihad. Historically, Ibn 
Taymiyyah’s fatwas of jihad, under al-Mamluks’ rule, “have been embraced 
enthusiastically by modern Islamic reform movements” (p.47). Hillenbrand (2000) 
wrote that jihad for Ibn Taymiyyah is to find “a society totally dedicated to God’s 
service” (p. 243).  
Bicer (2010) argues that there are several significant insights for such a vision. 
First, the mid-thirteenth century was a time of danger and crisis for Islam. The danger 
was not simply from external enemies, in the Dar al-Harb, but from enemies within, 
in the Dar al-Islam itself” (p.47). Second, “jihad is the path to renewal in Islam, but 
that renewal requires both armed struggle and spiritual struggle” (p.90). Third, “no one 
is exempt from the struggle, when Islam is threatened at its very heart to propagate 
Islam amongst non-believers” (p.91). Unfortunately, the terms such as ‘non-believers’ 
and “apostate” are often used to qualify many other Muslim sectors. It should not be 
hidden that many recent jurists nowadays are adopting Ibn Taymiyyah’s notions like 





1.6.2 Political Speech 
A political speech is a political text based on functional and thematic criteria 
(Schaffner, 1997). Political speeches are a part of and/ or the outcomes of politics. 
Historically and politically, they are regulated to satisfy different functions due to 
different political activities.  
1.6.3 Critical Discourse Analysis 
Critical linguistics has contributed to the emergence of CDA which has been 
developing since the 1970s. Nowadays, CDA is widely used by scholars to analyse 
discourses that deal with social and political issues shaped by ideology and power 
relations conveyed through language (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Wodak and 
Meyer, 2001; Wodak and Krzyzanowski, 2008). A critical discourse analysis can be 
carried out from two perspectives. First, a researcher may start from the pragmatic 
micro-level and ask which strategic functions (e.g. presuppositions) serve to fulfil 
politics (Schaffner, 1997).Secondly, he/she may begin from the macro-level, namely 
the interactive situation and the function of a text and ask which discursive strategies 
and topoi have been selected to achieve that function. 
1.6.4 Al-Qa’ida 
Al-Qa’ida is a global militant Sunni multi-national group originated in 1980s out 
of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan and consisted, later on, of many loosely 
organized networks (Byman, 2015). It starts to recruit members from thousands of 
“Arab Afghan” warriors and Muslim-Western radicals from different regions in the 
world. Hence, its social structures are widespread, yet its groups are decentralized 
(Atwan, 2008).  
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The principal aims of al-Qa’ida are to push Americans and Western forces out of 
Muslim lands, particularly from Saudi Arabia; defeat Israeli governments; and change 
Pan-American regimes with shariah rulers (Ibrahim, 2007). 
1.6.5 The Islamic State (IS) 
It is a local Sunni affiliate of al-Qa’ida in Iraq since 2004. It is made up of Saddam’s 
former veterans and other multinational militants, even as it recruits young boys and 
girls as “spoils of war” in Iraq and Syria (Alazreg, 2016, p.148). It teaches them to 
hate anyone who do not believe in its shariah laws, to behead and crush heads of 
Muslims and Westerns who oppose its dogmatic beliefs, to make bombs at schools and 
to perform jihad.  
IS has been established as a state and as a political organization with an ideology 
of a radical Salafi-jihadism. That is, it uses the jurisprudence of justification (shariah) 
to enact its applications in various areas. In the name of shariah, it performs dangerous 
and cruel acts such as suicide bombings, bank looting, and executions against those 
whom it considers as its foes such as Westerns and Sunni-Shi’ite people (Erikha, Putra 
and Sarwono, 2016, p.71). It also desires to unite Muslims and create, by force if 
necessary, an Islamic nation following the Islamic shariah. 
1.6.6 Ideology 
The concept of ideology adopted in the present study is defined by its three levels 
of cognition, society and discourse. Van Dijk (1998; 2006), pertaining to religious 
references, pointed out that “religious ideologies represent Us as (good) believers and 
Them as (bad) non-believers (infidels or heathens, etc.)” (p. 68).  
Van Dijk’s concept of ideology (1998) shows that each group claims and defends 
its ideological beliefs as true and justified. This kind of schism, as he believes, creates 
the rift between “Us and Them as two ideologically different groups” (p.65). That is 
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why ‘We’ is often associated with positive portrayal, on one hand, and ‘They’ with 
negative one, on the other hand.  
1.7 Organization of the Study 
The present study consists of seven chapters. Chapter One introduces an overview 
of the study, statement of the problem, research study which comprises the objectives, 
research questions, significance of the study and scope of the study. Chapter Two 
offers the background to the study in the contexts of the politics, society and history. 
It produces an overview of the terms of jihad in the Qur’an, the Prophet’s hadiths and 
traditional Islamic scholarship that are adopted and misused by al-Qa’ida and IS while 
highlighting the political and historical formations of these jihadi groups. Chapter 
Three elucidates the relationship between language, discourse, politics and ideology, 
reviews the previous research pertaining to the topic, shows a critical synthesis of 
literature according to relevant themes or variables, and debates the approaches and 
theories which delineate the theoretical framework of the study. 
Chapter Four presents a detailed description of the research design of the study. It 
explains and justifies how the political speeches are selected and collected, describes 
the sample size, data collection methods, and procedures. Chapters Five and Six are 
mainly dedicated to an in-depth analysis of the ten speeches. Chapter Seven delivers 










BACKGROUND TO JIHAD FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE 
TWO MOVEMENTS 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter examines the notions surrounding the problem of jihad and the ways 
in which it has been intensified by the lack of a key account of jihad among Islamic 
scholars. Additionally, it outlines the ways in which jihadi organizations such as al-
Qa’ida and the Islamic State have developed, by placing them into context in terms of 
how they have been affected by society, politics and history. To understand how and 
why jihadi organizations have developed and caused such radical changes in present-
day life, it is necessary to explore the political, social and historical contexts that have 
contributed to the prominence of their violent discourse.  
Renowned scholars such as Schaffner and Chilton (2002), Weiss and Wodak 
(2003), Chilton (2004), Jackson (2005), van Dijk (2007), Wodak and Krzyzanowski 
(2008), Hart (2011) and KhosraviNik (2015) when addressing similar questions, have 
adopted historical, social and political lens, while Reisigl’s and Wodak’s (2001, 2009) 
discourse-historical approach makes a bigger justification. For example, Hart (2011, 
p.1) confirms that “it is a key claim of discourse analysis that discourse is always pro-
duced and processed in context”, meaning to say there is nothing out of context. 
Similarly, Wodak (2008, p.11) argues that the historical and political contexts are 
“central concepts in our discourse analysis approach”. In a similar vein, van Dijk 
(2007) maintains that “we need to know how local (micro) situations may thus 
combine with more global (meso and macro) levels of context interpretation and 
influence” (p. xxxvi). Reisigl and Wodak (2009) name these (meso and macro) levels 
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of contextual background as a significant knowledge which can assist in the discourse 
analysis process. 
In light the above arguments, it is significant to have these portions of the historical 
and political contexts of jihad in mind in order to create a sound understanding of the 
ideological discourse of the non-state leaders and their speeches. Both politics and 
history are essential factors for investigating the conceptual language used by them to 
endorse their dogmatic beliefs. Assuming that, the following contexts are meant to be 
inevitably selective indications of the kinds of long-term memory background that 
could be retrieved in the interpretation of the two movements’ discourse. Within these 
contexts, the views of the foregoing scholars enhance the argument for this chapter. 
2.1 Traditional Language of Jihad: A Contested Concept 
In traditional Islam, there are several meanings for jihad, even though, generally 
speaking, religious scholars and politicians such as Ibn Taymiyyah (2004), al-
Jauziyyah (1994), Abd al-Wahhab, al-Banna (1990), al-Maududi (1980), Qutb (2006), 
Faraj (1986) and Abd Allah Azzam distinguish two major types of jihad depending on 
the historical and political context: defensive jihad in conflictual context (jihad al-Daf) 
and offensive jihad in peaceful context (jihad al-Talab), with an overlapping 
relationship between the two (Huzen, 2008; Hassan, 2014).  
Azzam (cited in Akbari, 2013) argues that when Muslims are under assault, it is a 
religious duty upon all influenced Muslims to take part in jihad. If they are not able to 
repel the foe, the commitment first stretches out to different Muslims living around a 
90-kilometer distance. If more jihadi youths are required, this distance is reached out 
until adequacy is accomplished or until it covers all Muslims. As for offensive jihad, 
it alludes to jihad battles against all Dar al-harb or non-Muslims not under the run of 
dar al-Islam. This must be done at any rate once per year by a Muslim runs the show. 
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Figure 2.1: Major Meanings of Jihad in Islamic Jurisprudence [adapted from al-
Jauziyyah (1994, pp.8-10), Huzen (2008, p.5)] 
 
Yusuf Ali (2000) is of the opinion that Muslims have two dominating sources of 
religious knowledge: The Qur’an, which is considered to be God’s revelation to His 
Prophet, Muhammad, and the Prophet’s hadiths which delineate his sayings. Both of 
these sources show jihad to be a purely Islamic concept. The Qur’an has 114 suras 
(chapters) shaped by 6,234 verses. Of all these verses, only twenty-eight have some 
reference to jihad, and the definition of jihad is mentioned practically forty-one times. 
The term jihad is derived from the Arabic root “juhd or jahada which means strove, 
laboured, or toiled; exerted oneself or one’s power or efforts or endeavours or ability” 
(Lane, 1968, p.473). Also, ‘juhd’ may constitute the root for verbs that emphasize the 
meaning of “exertion” and “contest” to achieve perfection in difficult tasks. 
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Expectedly, ‘ijtihad’, which means “to toil for understanding and interpreting of the 
Qur’an”, may have for its etymological meaning, the root of ‘juhd’. This is why many 
Muslim and Western scholarly studies require the traditional rationale of “holy war” 
or “crusade” to interpret current violent forms of global jihad. Yet, to see whether jihad 
is a crusade or holy war, or a totally different notion depends on reading the contexts 
of the term, as I will go into details on the authority interpreting the concept. 
2.1.1 Islamic Jihad: References from the Qur’an 
Jihad is regularly mentioned in the Qur’an, yet is frequently connected with fi sabil 
Allah (in the way of God). It is critical to note here that the Prophet Muhammad, while 
in Mecca, received verses of peace that most theological rationalists use to uncover 
reality about jihad in Islam (Huzen, 2008; Bowering, Crone and Mirza, 2013). In any 
case, in Medina, the Prophet received full religious and political authority and got full 
initiative over the entire Medina society. That is why he was summoned by the 
Qur’anic verses of jihad to motivate his kin to safeguard their properties, houses and 
belongings against Mecca agnostics (Ali, 2000). Logically, the references to jihad in 
the Qur'an lies in the 38th, 39th and 40th verses that were uncovered in Medina. 
The following verses are considered by Muslim religious scholars among the most 
vital verses with respect to jihad. They build up how, when, and why jihad ought to be 
pursued out. They unmistakably express that for a Muslim to take part in an armed 
jihad, h/she should guard oneself, a property, securing his/her kin and righting an 
unjust action that happens for a church or a mosque where God’s name is frequently 
mentioned. The verses construct two criteria for jihad: i) the criterion of the just cause, 
and ii) the criteria of lawful action (Bowering, Crone and Mirza, 2013). They 
obviously express that a Muslim can just perform jihad for the sake of setting right a 
wrong in a critical situation.  
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Figure 2.2: Translated References from the Qur’an [adapted from (Arberry, 1996)] 
 
There is additional verse (22:60). It is of fundamental centrality for the investigation 
of jihad. It reads that “All that; and whosoever chastises after the manner that he was 
chastised and then again is oppressed, assuredly God will help him; surely God is All-
pardoning, All-forgiving.” This verse clearly delineates that jihad incorporates a 
perfect law; one cannot react to an offense in an exaggerated way than the one he got. 
In the Qur’an, Khadduri (2007) sees twenty-eight verses which motivate Muslims to 
fight disbelief out of suspicion, of supposition and disbelief out of hypocrisy. 
Besides, at a semantic level, I affirm that the implications of what Khadduri coins, 
as “sacred war” for Islamic jihad is not synonymous to “harb or qital”.  “Qital” is 
mentioned around 36 times in the Qur’an and peace is mentioned around 67 times. 
However, neither in the Qur’an nor in the Prophet's hadiths can one finds such an 
expression as ‘holy war’ that Khadduri alludes to. Thus, it is a challenge to any 







Table 2.1: Patterns of Jihad in the Qur’an [(adapted from Huzen (2008, p.8)] 
 
Perhaps the most debatable of jihad verses is the so-called “sword verse” (9:5). It reads 
“Then, when the sacred months are drawn away, slay the idolaters wherever you find 
them, and take them, and confine them, and lie in wait for them at every place”. This 
verse refers to a historical situation that happened within Arab lands and among Arabs 
only, but not, as Western writers often assert, among Christians and Jews in their lands. 
The verse is only applicable to the Arab idolaters, as opposed to the Christians and 
Jews, who are not to be wounded by the outcomes. I will argue that these various 
interpretations of jihad are semantic and linguistic gaps which can confuse many 
Western researchers should they try to interpret the texts literally. This is because in 
Arabic certain terms may have different meanings depending on their historical and 
political contexts.  
2.1.2 Islamic Jihad: References from the Prophet’s Hadiths 
As jihad counts as the apex of the summit of Islam and its dome and the way 
stations of its folk are at the loftiest way stations in Paradise, having a high status in 
the present world, so too they are the highest in this world and the next (al-
Jauziyyah,1994, Vol.3, p.5). The Messenger of God was at the highest peak of it, so 
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he mastered all sorts of it: He struggled in God with his heart and soul, calling (to 
Islam) and proclaiming (the truth), with the sword and the spear. His hours were 
devoted to jihad with his heart, his tongue and his hands. For this reason, he was the 
loftiest of all the worlds (pp.5-6). 
Next to the Qur’an in vitality is the Prophet’s hadiths about jihad that is the 
traditions of what the Prophet said, taught, and did. These collections are called Sunna 
or “tradition”. In Islam, six of these collections in specific are considered reliable 
“Sahih”. These are Sahih Bukhari (810-870), Sahih Muslim (821-975), Sunan Abu 
Dawud (d. 888), Sunan ibn Majah (d. 896), Sunan al-Tirmidhi (824-893) and Sunan 
al-Nasa’i (d. 915). These collections of hadith are in volumes and have a lot to tell 
about jihad. However, I will examine a number of significant hadiths that are 
frequently used to reveal the (non)violent meanings of jihad. Al-Manawi in his Faid 
al-Qadir (vol.4, p.511) reported that when the Prophet Muhammad returned from one 
of his battles, he told his people: “We return from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad.” 
The greater jihad here is a more vital struggle against one’s selfishness and carnal 
desires.  
The above hadith which is used as proof for establishing the notion of greater and 
lesser jihad is weak because it has no reference in the sixth Islamic sources of hadith. 
Shienbaum (2006) and Esposito (2002), author of Unholy War, do not even mention 
from where they get the notion. Instead, one of the counter-maxim or hadith with a 
better chain of transmission is narrated on the authority of Abu Sa’id Khudri that the 
Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) said (to him): “Abu Sa’id, whoever cheerfully accepts God 
as his Lord, Islam as his religion and Muhammad as his Apostle, is necessarily entitled 
to enter Paradise”. He (Abu Sa’id) speculated at it and said: “Messenger of God, repeat 
it for me”. He said that: “There is another act which elevates the position of a man in 
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Paradise to a grade one hundred (higher), and the elevation between one grade and the 
other is equal to the height of the heaven from the earth”. He asked: “What is that act? 
He replied: jihad in the way of God” (Sahih Muslim, 20:4645). 
The key point in the hadith of greater and lesser jihad above and the likes thereof 
is that there is no mention in the Prophet’s attitude to Mecca Arabs and Jewish people 
that would seem a suppression of their human rights as Bostom (2006) and Shienbaum 
(2006) suggest in their studies about the legacy of Islamic jihad. He is God’s 
Messenger who should call all human beings to perform their daily actions in 
accordance with their true nature. Thus, he guides them to their just and moral interests. 
Like other prophets before him such as Moses and Jesus, he calls upon pagans to accept 
and obey God, their Creator. Jihad had to be seen in this historical context.  
Undeniably, the Prophet Muhammad inspired Muslims to perform jihad over many 
years obeying God’s commands in this respect, to achieve justice for humankind, but 
not to risk the lives of Muslims for the cause of advancing a colonial Islamic empire. 
That is why there is a need to understand the concept of jihad within its historical and 
political contexts through the holy references: The Qur’an and the prophet’s hadiths. 
2.1.3 The Notion of Jihad in Islamic Scholarship 
Among Muslim scholars, a considerable conceptual difference can be found 
concerning the theoretical notions of jihad. Ibn Taymiyyah (2004, vol. 28, p. 349), 
states that the root of this chapter (on penalties) is to wage holy war against the 
disbelievers, the enemies of God and His Messenger. Whosoever takes cognizance of 
the Messenger’s call to the religion of God with which He sent forth, but he fails to 
respond, must be fought, (until sedition is no more and religion is all for God) (Qur’an, 
8:39). He adds as for the People of the Book and the Magians, they are to be fought 
until they profess Islam or (pay the tribute out of hand). (p. 355). 
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Jauziyyah (1994, pp 9-10) mentions that jihad against the evil inciting self is, in 
turn, of four levels: The first is to struggle against the self via teaching her guidance 
and true faith, without which there will be neither felicity nor happiness. Should the 
self fail to recognize it, she will be wretched in the two abodes. The second is to 
struggle against it through putting into practice what one has already known. As for 
mere knowledge, it only harms the self. The third is to struggle against it through 
calling mankind to God and teaching the guidance. The fourth is to struggle against it 
through enduring patiently the hardships of calling to God and bearing all for God.  
When all these four features are fulfilled, one will be one of the lordly. For the 
worthy ancestors agree that a learned scholar cannot be called “lordly” unless he 
recognizes the truth, puts it into practice and teaches it. He who comes to know, 
practises and teaches is called “great” in the dominion of the heavens. 
Al-Banna (1990), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (al-Ikhwan al-
Muslimin), makes a literal use of the verses and hadiths in his views on jihad to support 
his ideology of establishing a universal caliphate. For him, jihad in shariah is the 
battling of the unbelievers, and it includes every single conceivable exertion that is 
important to disassemble the influence of the adversaries of Islam including beating 
them, looting their riches, wrecking their places and crushing their deities (Aaron, 
2008).  
Ideologically, he asserts that classical religious scholars are of one assessment on 
matter of jihad and this is independent of whether these scholars are Mujtahadeen or 
Mugalideen. He maintains that regardless of whether these scholars are Salaf or khalaf. 
They all admit consistently that jihad is a Farida (duty) forced upon the Islamic 
community to spread the da’wa of Islam, and that jihad is farid ayn if a foe assaults 
Muslim Lands. Today, al-Banna sees Muslims compelled to be subservient before 
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others and are administered by foreign forces. Muslim lands have been assaulted and 
their (own) belongings, respect and privacy are violated and abused. Their foes are 
ignoring their undertakings, and the customs of their religion are under the adversary's 
ward. Still, Muslims neglect to meet the obligation of da’wa of jihad. Subsequently, 
in this circumstance, it turns into the obligation of every single Muslim to make jihad.  
As for Faraj (1986), he maintains that jihad is not only mandatory in Islam, or 
rather, it is the soul of faith altogether. He gives grounds for the necessity of jihad in 
light of the proofs of legislation, which is the Qur’an, the Sunna and Islamic 
scholarship. Like Ibn Taymiyyah (2004), al-Jauziyyah (1994) and Abd al-Wahhab, he 
refers to the most authentic collections of hadith to support his positions and attitudes. 
He declares that no community shuns jihad except that it suffers intense humiliation, 
a reference to a report he has quoted from the Sunan of Abu Dawud. 
Al-Maqdisi (2010) urges all Muslims to live by the regulation of what he names as 
“wala’ wa bara” (Befriending and Dissociating or Loyalty and Enmity). He argues 
that Muslims should be indisputably faithful towards God. Simply put, a Muslim must 
be steadfast and wanting to everything that lines up with God’s orders. Second, all 
Muslims need to disclaim everything that contradicts God’s commands, especially 
Western beliefs. His notions of loyalty and enmity speak out a doctrine for all 
supporters of the jihadi ideology. In fact, his thoughts are resonant among the five 
doctrinal rules where today’s militant grow, for example, al-Qa'ida and IS. The other 
four doctrines are: “tawhid” (monotheism), “aqidah” (doctrine), “takfir” 
(excommunicate) and jihad. 
A sixth important Muslim and jihadi scholar, Qutb, notes that jihad is not simply a 
tool limited to the defensive struggle against external violence; nor was it restricted to 
the spiritual jihad (inner struggle). Rather, he assigns the physical jihad to any practical 
